Ants, frogs, snakes and bats
May 12, 2014 6:57:05 GMT -5
Post by Deleted on May 12, 2014 6:57:05 GMT -5
Here we see an example of typical transatlantic tomfoolery:
This awful clown, evidently heterosexually inclined, is "Professor" Eduardo Kohn, who has latterly written a book entitled How Forests Think: toward an anthropology beyond the human. It is reviewed in the T.L.S. of April the twenty-fifth. The reviewer herself is also a transatlantic person, and even she is moved to write "At times his writing style is thick with jargon, and one has to plough through dense passages that repeatedly strain comprehension. 'The word Ruma in the Quichua language,' whinnies Kohn, is used as a kind of pronominal marker of the subject position - for all selves see themselves as persons - and it is only hypostasized as ethnonym in objectifying practices such as ethnography, racial discrimination, and identity politics.'"
And yet the clown is probably correct when he points out that forest creatures without language do think, represent the world, and make meaning on their own. He relies heavily, Miss King tells us, "on Charles Peirce's notion that signs should be defined broadly to include those with and those without linguistic properties. Icons, said Pierce, are signs of likeness; indices, by contrast, point to something entirely other; and the third typs of sign - symbols - involve convention and are unique to our own race."
Groping in the right sense but falling spectacularly short what!
This awful clown, evidently heterosexually inclined, is "Professor" Eduardo Kohn, who has latterly written a book entitled How Forests Think: toward an anthropology beyond the human. It is reviewed in the T.L.S. of April the twenty-fifth. The reviewer herself is also a transatlantic person, and even she is moved to write "At times his writing style is thick with jargon, and one has to plough through dense passages that repeatedly strain comprehension. 'The word Ruma in the Quichua language,' whinnies Kohn, is used as a kind of pronominal marker of the subject position - for all selves see themselves as persons - and it is only hypostasized as ethnonym in objectifying practices such as ethnography, racial discrimination, and identity politics.'"
And yet the clown is probably correct when he points out that forest creatures without language do think, represent the world, and make meaning on their own. He relies heavily, Miss King tells us, "on Charles Peirce's notion that signs should be defined broadly to include those with and those without linguistic properties. Icons, said Pierce, are signs of likeness; indices, by contrast, point to something entirely other; and the third typs of sign - symbols - involve convention and are unique to our own race."
Groping in the right sense but falling spectacularly short what!
