Morality and religion
Sept 4, 2013 2:57:24 GMT -5
Post by Deleted on Sept 4, 2013 2:57:24 GMT -5
I have never before heard of the University of London's "Heythrop College"; nevertheless Mr. Cottingham is a Professorial Research Fellow there, and he has a problem about which he has thoughtfully written in to consult us. Here is what is troubling him:
"Should we do your members think embrace a theistic account of ethical objectivity? Such an alternative is ruled out in advance by a great many 'contemporary' moral philosophers, because they have convinced themselves that God-based accounts are subject to a fatal flaw, namely the notorious Euthyphro dilemma (an updated version of a problem originally raised in Plato's dialogue of the same name). If merely being ordered to do something by God is enough to make it good or right, this seems to make morality arbitrary and potentially irrational ('Do this because I say so'); but if, on the other hand, the God-given demands of morality are based on moral reasons ('Do this because it is just/kind/virtuous'), then the appeal to God seems to become redundant - why not simply base morality on the relevant reasons of justice or kindness or virtue?"
Thus Mr. Cottingham's question. But can we not we wonder apply our powers of definition to an evaporation of the distinction? Namely, equate or define these "moral reasons" with "the being ordered to do something by God"? The question, as in the case of so many questions, if not even all, is necessarily one the answer to which we at bottom already know. Has not Ludwig Widdlestein so long ago now told us that "6.432 How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher; God does not reveal himself in the world. . . . 6.5 The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it."
But what did Widdlestein mean there by "exist"?
"Should we do your members think embrace a theistic account of ethical objectivity? Such an alternative is ruled out in advance by a great many 'contemporary' moral philosophers, because they have convinced themselves that God-based accounts are subject to a fatal flaw, namely the notorious Euthyphro dilemma (an updated version of a problem originally raised in Plato's dialogue of the same name). If merely being ordered to do something by God is enough to make it good or right, this seems to make morality arbitrary and potentially irrational ('Do this because I say so'); but if, on the other hand, the God-given demands of morality are based on moral reasons ('Do this because it is just/kind/virtuous'), then the appeal to God seems to become redundant - why not simply base morality on the relevant reasons of justice or kindness or virtue?"
Thus Mr. Cottingham's question. But can we not we wonder apply our powers of definition to an evaporation of the distinction? Namely, equate or define these "moral reasons" with "the being ordered to do something by God"? The question, as in the case of so many questions, if not even all, is necessarily one the answer to which we at bottom already know. Has not Ludwig Widdlestein so long ago now told us that "6.432 How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher; God does not reveal himself in the world. . . . 6.5 The riddle does not exist. If a question can be framed at all, it is also possible to answer it."
But what did Widdlestein mean there by "exist"?