The Duke of Argyll
Aug 30, 2013 0:33:25 GMT -5
Post by Deleted on Aug 30, 2013 0:33:25 GMT -5
1) The Reality is in the Relation
The philosophical labours of the Duke of Argyll have for a number of reasons never been awarded the attention they deserve. Here of course we cannot reproduce more than one or two passages, but we hope they will suffice to indicate the power, the lucidity, and the penetrativeness of his thought. The keystone of my own philosophy has long been expressed in the formula "the reality is in the relation," and - the Duke is with me! Let us then look at the first chapter of his Unity of Nature:
"The System of Nature in which we live impresses itself on the mind as one System. It is under this impression that we speak of it as the Universe. It was under the same impression, but with a conception specially vivid of its order and its beauty, that the Greeks called it the Kosmos. By such words as these, we mean that Nature is one Whole - a Whole of which all the parts are inseparably united - joined together by the most curious and intimate relations, which it is the highest work of Observation to trace, and of Reason to understand.
"One thing is certain: that whatever science may have done, or may be doing, to confirm Man's idea of the Unity of Nature, science, in the modern acceptation of the term, did not give rise to it. The idea had arisen long before science in this sense was born. That is to say, the idea existed before the acquisition of physical knowledge had been raised to the dignity of a pursuit, and before the methods and the results of that pursuit had been reduced to system. Theology, no doubt, had more to do with it. The idea of the Unity of Nature must be at least as old as the idea of one God: and even those who believe in the derivation of Man from the Savage and the Brute, cannot tell us how soon the Monotheistic doctrine arose. The Jewish literature and traditions, which are at least among the oldest in the world, exhibit this doctrine in the purest form, and represent it as the doctrine of primæval times. The earliest indications of religious thought among the Aryan races point in the same direction. The records of that mysterious civilization which had been established on the Nile at a date long anterior to the Call of Abraham, are more and more clearly yielding results in harmony with the tradition of the Jews. The Polytheism of Egypt is being traced and tracked through the many and the easy paths which lead to the fashioning of many Gods out of the attributes of One. [Renouf: "Hibbert Lectures," 1879, p.89]
"Probably those who do not accept this conclusion as historically proved may hold rather that the idea of the Unity of Nature preceded the idea of the Unity of God, and that Monotheism is but the form in which that earlier idea became embodied. It matters not, so far as my present purpose is concerned, which of these two has been the real order of events. If the law prevailing in the infancy of our race has been at all like the law prevailing in the infancy of the individual, then Man's first Beliefs were derived from Authority, and not from either reasoning or observation. I do not myself believe that in the morning of the world Theism arose as the result of philosophical speculation, or as the result of Imagination personifying some abstract idea of the Unity of external Nature. But if this were possible, then it would follow that while a perception of the Unity of Nature must be at least as old as the idea of one Creator, it may be a good deal older. Whether the two ideas were ever actually separated in history, it is certain that they can be, and are, separated at the present time. A sense and a perception of the Unity of Nature - strong, imaginative, and almost mystic in its character - is now prevalent among men over whom the idea of the personal agency of a living God has, to say the least, a much weaker hold.
"What, then, is this Unity of Nature? Is it a fact or an imagination? Is it a reality or a dream? Is it a mere poetic fancy incapable of definition, or is it a conception firmly and legitimately founded on the phenomena of the world?
"But there is another question which comes before these. What do we mean by unity? In what sense can we say that an infinite number and variety of things are nevertheless one? This is an important question, because it is very possible to look for the Unity of Nature in such a manner that, instead of extending our knowledge, or rendering it more clear and definite, we may rather narrow it, and render it more confused. It has been said that all knowledge consists in the perception of difference. This is not accurate; but it is true that the perception of difference is the necessary foundation of all knowledge. For if it be possible to give any short definition of that in which essentially all knowledge consists, perhaps the nearest approach to such a definition would be this: that knowledge is the perception of relations. To know a thing and to understand it, is to know it in its relation to other things. But the first step in this knowledge is to know it as distinguished from other things. The perception of mere difference comes before the perception of all other and higher relations.
"It is well, therefore, to remember that no increase of knowledge can be acquired by a wilful confounding or a careless forgetfulness of distinctions. We may choose to call two things one, because we choose to look at them in one aspect only, and to disregard them in other aspects quite as obvious, and perhaps much more important. And thus we may create a unity which is purely artificial, or which represents nothing but a comparatively insignificant incident in the System of Nature. For as things may be related to each other in an infinite variety of ways in form, or in size, or in substance, or in position, or in modes of origin, or in laws of growth, or in work and function so there are an infinite number and variety of aspects in which unity can be traced. And these aspects rise in an ascending series according to the completeness of our knowledge of things, and according to the development of those intellectual faculties by which alone the higher relations between them can be perceived. For the perception of every relation, even that of mere physical continuity, is purely the work of Mind, and this work can be performed only in proportion to the materials which are supplied, and to the power of interpretation which is enjoyed. It is very easy to rest satisfied with the perception of the commoner and more obvious relations of things to each other, and even to be so engrossed with these as to be rendered altogether incapable of perceiving the finer and less palpable relations which constitute the higher aspects of the Unity of Nature. New relations, too, which are by no means obvious, but on the contrary can only be discovered by laborious analysis, may from the mere effect of novelty, engross attention far beyond their real importance. Nay, more it may be said, with truth, that this is a danger which, for a time at least, increases with the progress of science, because it must obviously beset special subjects of inquiry and special methods of research. The division of labour necessarily becomes more and more minute with the complication of the work which is to be done, and branches out into a thousand channels of inquiry, each of which finds its natural termination in the ascertainment of some one special series of relations. The Chemist is engaged with the elementary combinations of matter, and finds a unity of composition among things which in all other aspects are totally diverse. The Anatomist is concerned with structure, and separates widely between things which may nevertheless be identical in chemical composition. The Physiologist is concerned with function: and, finding the same offices performed by a vast variety of structures, ranges them across all their differences under a single name. The Comparative Anatomist is concerned with the relative place or position of the parts in Organic structures; and, although he finds the same part in different creatures performing widely different functions, he nevertheless pronounces them to be the same, and to be one in the homologies of an ideal archetype. But each of these inquirers may be satisfied with the particular unity which his own investigations lead him specially to observe, and may be blind altogether to the unity which is next above it.
"Nor is it specialists alone who are in danger of forming narrow and inadequate conceptions of the Unity of Nature. Minds whose tendency it is to generalize are even more exposed to this danger than minds whose passion it is to investigate and arrange a particular class of facts. The work of generalization is essentially a work of selection - the selection and separation of that which is essential from that which is comparatively unimportant, in the great connecting lines of Nature. If in this work the principle of selection be a wrong one - if it be founded on a narrow conception and a very partial understanding of the facts - if the great lines are not seen to be what they really are, and if little divergent lines are followed in their stead - then the most ambitious generalizations of science may be far more deceiving than the most despised of vulgar errors. For indeed these errors are sometimes errors only in their form, whilst in substance they are often full of spirit and of truth. In them, not seldom, the popular eye has caught and reflected the masses of the forest which the man of science has been prevented from seeing by the trees. And so it may well be that the sense of unity in Nature, which Man has had from very early times, reflected in such words as the 'Universe,' and in his belief in one God, is a higher and fuller perception of the truth than is commonly attained either by those who are engrossed in the laborious investigation of details, or by those who struggle to compress all the wealth of Nature within some abstract formula of the laboratory or of the workshop."
The philosophical labours of the Duke of Argyll have for a number of reasons never been awarded the attention they deserve. Here of course we cannot reproduce more than one or two passages, but we hope they will suffice to indicate the power, the lucidity, and the penetrativeness of his thought. The keystone of my own philosophy has long been expressed in the formula "the reality is in the relation," and - the Duke is with me! Let us then look at the first chapter of his Unity of Nature:
"The System of Nature in which we live impresses itself on the mind as one System. It is under this impression that we speak of it as the Universe. It was under the same impression, but with a conception specially vivid of its order and its beauty, that the Greeks called it the Kosmos. By such words as these, we mean that Nature is one Whole - a Whole of which all the parts are inseparably united - joined together by the most curious and intimate relations, which it is the highest work of Observation to trace, and of Reason to understand.
"One thing is certain: that whatever science may have done, or may be doing, to confirm Man's idea of the Unity of Nature, science, in the modern acceptation of the term, did not give rise to it. The idea had arisen long before science in this sense was born. That is to say, the idea existed before the acquisition of physical knowledge had been raised to the dignity of a pursuit, and before the methods and the results of that pursuit had been reduced to system. Theology, no doubt, had more to do with it. The idea of the Unity of Nature must be at least as old as the idea of one God: and even those who believe in the derivation of Man from the Savage and the Brute, cannot tell us how soon the Monotheistic doctrine arose. The Jewish literature and traditions, which are at least among the oldest in the world, exhibit this doctrine in the purest form, and represent it as the doctrine of primæval times. The earliest indications of religious thought among the Aryan races point in the same direction. The records of that mysterious civilization which had been established on the Nile at a date long anterior to the Call of Abraham, are more and more clearly yielding results in harmony with the tradition of the Jews. The Polytheism of Egypt is being traced and tracked through the many and the easy paths which lead to the fashioning of many Gods out of the attributes of One. [Renouf: "Hibbert Lectures," 1879, p.89]
"Probably those who do not accept this conclusion as historically proved may hold rather that the idea of the Unity of Nature preceded the idea of the Unity of God, and that Monotheism is but the form in which that earlier idea became embodied. It matters not, so far as my present purpose is concerned, which of these two has been the real order of events. If the law prevailing in the infancy of our race has been at all like the law prevailing in the infancy of the individual, then Man's first Beliefs were derived from Authority, and not from either reasoning or observation. I do not myself believe that in the morning of the world Theism arose as the result of philosophical speculation, or as the result of Imagination personifying some abstract idea of the Unity of external Nature. But if this were possible, then it would follow that while a perception of the Unity of Nature must be at least as old as the idea of one Creator, it may be a good deal older. Whether the two ideas were ever actually separated in history, it is certain that they can be, and are, separated at the present time. A sense and a perception of the Unity of Nature - strong, imaginative, and almost mystic in its character - is now prevalent among men over whom the idea of the personal agency of a living God has, to say the least, a much weaker hold.
"What, then, is this Unity of Nature? Is it a fact or an imagination? Is it a reality or a dream? Is it a mere poetic fancy incapable of definition, or is it a conception firmly and legitimately founded on the phenomena of the world?
"But there is another question which comes before these. What do we mean by unity? In what sense can we say that an infinite number and variety of things are nevertheless one? This is an important question, because it is very possible to look for the Unity of Nature in such a manner that, instead of extending our knowledge, or rendering it more clear and definite, we may rather narrow it, and render it more confused. It has been said that all knowledge consists in the perception of difference. This is not accurate; but it is true that the perception of difference is the necessary foundation of all knowledge. For if it be possible to give any short definition of that in which essentially all knowledge consists, perhaps the nearest approach to such a definition would be this: that knowledge is the perception of relations. To know a thing and to understand it, is to know it in its relation to other things. But the first step in this knowledge is to know it as distinguished from other things. The perception of mere difference comes before the perception of all other and higher relations.
"It is well, therefore, to remember that no increase of knowledge can be acquired by a wilful confounding or a careless forgetfulness of distinctions. We may choose to call two things one, because we choose to look at them in one aspect only, and to disregard them in other aspects quite as obvious, and perhaps much more important. And thus we may create a unity which is purely artificial, or which represents nothing but a comparatively insignificant incident in the System of Nature. For as things may be related to each other in an infinite variety of ways in form, or in size, or in substance, or in position, or in modes of origin, or in laws of growth, or in work and function so there are an infinite number and variety of aspects in which unity can be traced. And these aspects rise in an ascending series according to the completeness of our knowledge of things, and according to the development of those intellectual faculties by which alone the higher relations between them can be perceived. For the perception of every relation, even that of mere physical continuity, is purely the work of Mind, and this work can be performed only in proportion to the materials which are supplied, and to the power of interpretation which is enjoyed. It is very easy to rest satisfied with the perception of the commoner and more obvious relations of things to each other, and even to be so engrossed with these as to be rendered altogether incapable of perceiving the finer and less palpable relations which constitute the higher aspects of the Unity of Nature. New relations, too, which are by no means obvious, but on the contrary can only be discovered by laborious analysis, may from the mere effect of novelty, engross attention far beyond their real importance. Nay, more it may be said, with truth, that this is a danger which, for a time at least, increases with the progress of science, because it must obviously beset special subjects of inquiry and special methods of research. The division of labour necessarily becomes more and more minute with the complication of the work which is to be done, and branches out into a thousand channels of inquiry, each of which finds its natural termination in the ascertainment of some one special series of relations. The Chemist is engaged with the elementary combinations of matter, and finds a unity of composition among things which in all other aspects are totally diverse. The Anatomist is concerned with structure, and separates widely between things which may nevertheless be identical in chemical composition. The Physiologist is concerned with function: and, finding the same offices performed by a vast variety of structures, ranges them across all their differences under a single name. The Comparative Anatomist is concerned with the relative place or position of the parts in Organic structures; and, although he finds the same part in different creatures performing widely different functions, he nevertheless pronounces them to be the same, and to be one in the homologies of an ideal archetype. But each of these inquirers may be satisfied with the particular unity which his own investigations lead him specially to observe, and may be blind altogether to the unity which is next above it.
"Nor is it specialists alone who are in danger of forming narrow and inadequate conceptions of the Unity of Nature. Minds whose tendency it is to generalize are even more exposed to this danger than minds whose passion it is to investigate and arrange a particular class of facts. The work of generalization is essentially a work of selection - the selection and separation of that which is essential from that which is comparatively unimportant, in the great connecting lines of Nature. If in this work the principle of selection be a wrong one - if it be founded on a narrow conception and a very partial understanding of the facts - if the great lines are not seen to be what they really are, and if little divergent lines are followed in their stead - then the most ambitious generalizations of science may be far more deceiving than the most despised of vulgar errors. For indeed these errors are sometimes errors only in their form, whilst in substance they are often full of spirit and of truth. In them, not seldom, the popular eye has caught and reflected the masses of the forest which the man of science has been prevented from seeing by the trees. And so it may well be that the sense of unity in Nature, which Man has had from very early times, reflected in such words as the 'Universe,' and in his belief in one God, is a higher and fuller perception of the truth than is commonly attained either by those who are engrossed in the laborious investigation of details, or by those who struggle to compress all the wealth of Nature within some abstract formula of the laboratory or of the workshop."
