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Post by Deleted on Dec 26, 2013 9:04:16 GMT -5
"What can science teach us about the natural world?" shrieks Fräulein Breitenbach, one of the Lecturers in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. Her first book, Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur, is said to "examine Kant's theory of organic nature and its implications for contemporary philosophy of science." Kant is never off the menu in Cambridge! Englishmen from all walks of life are ever greedy for a little Kant, and Miss Breitenbach will always be there to feed that essentially unnatural hunger. She appears every lunch-time at the Cambridge Kant-canteen and dishes out scarcely digestible dollops of "pure reason" to slavering students who gobble it all thoughtlessly up. "Philosophers have long argued over this simple question," she continues. BUT - already at this point I have a really deep-seated question for Fräulein Breitenbach: is some one who argues over a simple question worthy of the name "philosopher"? Is it not the mark of a true philosopher that he will NOT argue about simple questions?Apparently Mr. Friedman - "Michael" to his inti-mates - has put out a book: " Kant's Construction of Nature" it is called, and its sub-title is "A reading of the metaphysical foundations of natural science." That - " The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science" - is the title of a little book Kant wrote about the "principles" that are specifically required for "experience" of "material nature." These principles include his "laws of mechanics" which bear a striking similarity to Newton's laws of motion (which, according to Einstein, are woefully inadequate). Anyway this Mr. Friedman devoted thirty years of intellectual labour to the study of Kant's book. What "conditions" (cried Kant) need to be "in place" in order for Newton's theory to give a mathematical description of the "material world"? [ A few definitions of the expressions I have quoted would not be out of place would they?] Friedman explains that for Kant time and space are not simply given to us as objects in experience, but must first [!] be constructed in a reference frame. Well! Members may read more about it all in the T.L.S. of November the twenty-ninth. "Friedman's reading of Kant is a profound contribution to the debate about what science can teach us about the world," concludes the Fräulein. But I wonder. Does it really take us at all further forward?
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Post by Deleted on Dec 26, 2013 17:33:28 GMT -5
Yes.
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Post by Deleted on Dec 26, 2013 23:06:47 GMT -5
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Post by Deleted on Dec 27, 2013 2:44:05 GMT -5
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Post by Deleted on Dec 27, 2013 18:43:38 GMT -5
Something has to be possible before it can be actual before it can be necessary, Sydney? What do you mean by "actual" kleines c? And for that matter, kleines c, what do you mean by "something"?
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Post by Deleted on Dec 28, 2013 3:58:44 GMT -5
Good morning, Sydney! I trust that all is well with you this weekend, and that you had an enjoyable Christmas. As usual, we all went to mass, my elder sister cooked Christmas dinner for the extended family and great fun was had by all! Out of interest, did you see any of your family over the Christmas holidays? If I may nevertheless address both your final questions directly: a. What do you mean by "actual" kleines c? Real. b. And for that matter, kleines c, what do you mean by "something"? Everything.
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Post by Deleted on Dec 28, 2013 5:58:16 GMT -5
So, kleines c. Suppose there is an unicorn in the toy-shop; would you say that that is an actual unicorn? And what about when we think about it; in what sense is our thought of the unicorn real?
Perhaps that introduces too many conditionals, so let us try the individual "Tony" Blair instead. Is "Tony" Blair real? Can you say so for certain? And how do you know? Consider that he is ninety parts in a hundred water. Does that render him any less actual? And suppose that you are "Tony" Blair's intimate friend; there is nothing about him you do not know. When you think about him, is your thought real? And how about a giant molecule made up of two hundred identical "Tony" Blairs? It is possible to imagine it is it not?
So, how does the "Tony" Blair reconstruction in your thoughts differ from the "Tony" Blair reconstruction you recognize one afternoon in the gentlemen's club? Or perhaps in fact it/he actually doesn't? Is that the sort of thing one is actually not meant to know?
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Post by Deleted on Dec 28, 2013 7:36:20 GMT -5
If I may address all twelve of your questions directly, Sydney: a. So, kleines c. Suppose there is an unicorn in the toy-shop; would you say that that is an actual unicorn? I would say that it is a toy unicorn. If it were not a toy unicorn, what would it be doing in the toy-shop? Is a toy unicorn actual? It is an actual toy. Is a toy unicorn real? It is a real toy. b. And what about when we think about it; in what sense is our thought of the unicorn real? It is real in the sense that it is in a toy-shop, Sydney. The unicorn is a real toy. Our thought of the unicorn is real in the sense that the toy unicorn may stimulate our imagination(s). If the toy unicorn does not stimulate our imagination(s), our thought of the unicorn may not be real at all! All we may see is a toy in a toy-shop, Sydney? c. Perhaps that introduces too many conditionals, so let us try the individual "Tony" Blair instead. Is "Tony" Blair real? Yes, "Tony" Blair is real. I met him once, although whether he is for real is more difficult to say. I would say that we can be too clever by half! d. Can you say so for certain? Yes. I met him in Islington! f. Consider that he is ninety parts in a hundred water. Does that render him any less actual? No. If "Tony" Blair goes to the WC, he loses some water, as do we all. That does not make him any more or any less actual, although his mass and water content will have changed. g. And suppose that you are "Tony" Blair's intimate friend; there is nothing about him you do not know. When you think about him, is your thought real? I should perhaps clarify that I am not an intimate friend of "Tony" Blair. My thought about "Tony" Blair would not be real in the same sense that "Tony" Blair is real. Marcel Proust famously concluded that reality is a certain combination of sensation and memory. My thought about "Tony" Blair is real in a Proustian sense, Sydney. h. And how about a giant molecule made up of two hundred identical "Tony" Blairs? The chemistry might be rather complex, but I suppose that in the same way as we can think of identical twins, we can think of multiple versions or clones of "Tony" Blair. i. It is possible to imagine it is it not? Yes. Imagine that "Tony" Blair has many clones. j. So, how does the "Tony" Blair reconstruction in your thoughts differ from the "Tony" Blair reconstruction you recognize one afternoon in the gentlemen's club? How do you know that the "Tony" Blair reconstruction I recognise one afternoon in the gentlemen's club is only a reconstruction? It could really be "Tony" Blair, or indeed, his identical twin or clone. I suppose that the way I would tell the difference between "Tony" Blair and his clone in the gentlemen's club would be to ask him about a memory we share in Islington. k. Or perhaps in fact it/he actually doesn't? Perhaps not, but why should he, Sydney? I suppose that what makes us individuals are our memories. If we lose our memories, we lose our individuality. l. Is that the sort of thing one is actually not meant to know? "Tony" Blair might know it; kleines c might know it; one might know it. I suggest that you ask, Sydney! If Kant can't, who can?
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Post by ahinton on Dec 28, 2013 10:17:17 GMT -5
Yes, "Tony" Blair is real. I met him once, although whether he is for real is more difficult to say. ... If "Tony" Blair goes to the WC, he loses some water, as do we all. That does not make him any more or any less actual, although his mass and water content will have changed. Those things may have changed but that would not of itself indicate any other changes. I should perhaps clarify that I am not an intimate friend of "Tony" Blair. Well, that's fortunate! My thought about "Tony" Blair would not be real in the same sense that "Tony" Blair is real. Marcel Proust famously concluded that reality is a certain combination of sensation and memory. My thought about "Tony" Blair is real in a Proustian sense Mine would not be printable, so I naturally refrain from posting them here. The chemistry might be rather complex, but I suppose that in the same way as we can think of identical twins, we can think of multiple versions or clones of "Tony" Blair. On whose orders must anyone even think to do any such thing?! Imagine that "Tony" Blair has many clones. God forbid and perish the thought! How do you know that the "Tony" Blair reconstruction I recognise one afternoon in the gentlemen's club is only a reconstruction? It could really be "Tony" Blair, or indeed, his identical twin or clone. I suppose that the way I would tell the difference between "Tony" Blair and his clone in the gentlemen's club would be to ask him about a memory we share in Islington. Send in the Clones? All that I would wish to do for this unreconstructed and arguably unreconstructible person is show him where he can buy himself a ticket to Den Haag...
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Post by Deleted on Dec 29, 2013 7:16:14 GMT -5
I suppose that the way I would tell the difference between "Tony" Blair and his clone in the gentlemen's club would be to ask him about a memory we share in Islington. So suppose all of a sudden a second "Tony" Blair were to come along, and he convinced you that the first one was only a very skilful, well-briefed and convincing impersonator. Would you not then say that the first "Tony" Blair was not the real, "Tony" Blair, and in actual fact never had been. The second one was the actual "Tony" Blair you knew from Islington days you would emphatically exclaim! But then again, a little while later, suppose that all of a sudden a third "Tony" Blair were to come along . . . [ repeat ad infinitum]. What is actual or real in all that? Should we perhaps dump our notions of reality and actuality as unfit for purpose? Laggard material are they not?
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Post by Deleted on Dec 29, 2013 9:59:52 GMT -5
If I may address all six of your questions directly, Sydney: a. So suppose all of a sudden a second "Tony" Blair were to come along, and he convinced you that the first one was only a very skilful, well-briefed and convincing impersonator. Would you not then say that the first "Tony" Blair was not the real, "Tony" Blair, and in actual fact never had been. Yes. b. The second one was the actual "Tony" Blair you knew from Islington days you would emphatically exclaim! Memories are all we have to go on here, and of course, it is possible to copy someone else's memory, fake it, make a memory up, or even distort an existing memory. My own memory, for example, sometimes plays tricks with me. I suspect that memories are a mixture of hard wiring and soft wiring in our brains, so to speak, and I admit that it might be impossible for me to work out who is the real "Tony" Blair. c. But then again, a little while later, suppose that all of a sudden a third "Tony" Blair were to come along . . . [repeat ad infinitum]. It might ultimately be impossible for me to distinguish between them. In the same way, it might not be possible for me to distinguish between Sydney and Gerard. d. What is actual or real in all that? Nothing. Immanuel Kant thought that it might be impossible to distinguish between our perceptions of reality and the underlying reality itself. Kant does not question kleines c's analysis of the world; instead, he redefines kleines c's experience of the world. Kleines c now lives in two realms. One is that of things as they are and the other is that of things as they appear to be. We can never know things as they are, Sydney, and when I perceive things in experience, my mind has had a formative part in the way they appear. There may indeed be a true connection between what I see and what is really there. What kleines c now needs to do is to prove it. Immanuel Kant, too, thought that he might be wrong. Indeed, he argued that it is permanently impossible for us to know whether or not God exists, and whether or not we have souls. Nevertheless, he explained that our beliefs in such things are founded directly in our primitive moral convictions themselves. If Kant is right, it is my conception of right and wrong, wherever it comes from, which is the really fundamental thing about me, while theology, metaphysics and philosophy are a rather frail, high-flying superstructure. I am quite happy to think that my own speculations don't really amount to very much. You too, Sydney? e. Should we perhaps dump our notions of reality and actuality as unfit for purpose? Yes. f. Laggard material are they not? Yes. Reality and actuality are laggard material. You have finally become a Kantian in your old age, Sydney! Congratulations! Of course, Ludwig Wittgenstein dismissed all this laggard material as problems of language. To ask whether "Tony" Blair is real or not is beside the point. What use is he?
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Post by ahinton on Dec 29, 2013 18:17:15 GMT -5
Laggard material are they not? I read that as "Langaard" first time around. Coat getting time, methinks...
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Post by Deleted on Dec 30, 2013 9:43:38 GMT -5
So - in respect of actuality, there is no distinction between "Tony" Blair and a unicorn. They are equally unreal, are they not? Our notions of both of them are merely cobbled together from our memories and assumptions. Much the same may be said of "something" ( = "everything"). Is not the world then necessarily a kind of hypothesis?
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Post by Deleted on Dec 30, 2013 12:01:14 GMT -5
If I may address all five of your final points directly, Sydney: a. So - in respect of actuality, there is no distinction between "Tony" Blair and a unicorn. On the contrary, what we demonstrated was that there might be no distinction between "Tony" Blair and an identical version of "Tony" Blair. The word "identical" indicates that there is no difference. There may be a difference in memory, however, but memories, too, can be faked! I would still contend that in respect of actuality, there is a demonstrable difference between "Tony" Blair and a unicorn. A unicorn looks very different from an identical version of "Tony" Blair! b. They are equally unreal, are they not? No! "Tony" Blair is a former British Prime Minister whom I once met in Islington, whereas the notion of a unicorn is debatable. Wikipedia - Unicornc. Our notions of both of them are merely cobbled together from our memories and assumptions. On the contrary, if you pay "Tony" enough money, Sydney, you can still meet him! d. Much the same may be said of "something" ( = "everything"). [/b] On the contrary, something different may be said of a unicorn. e. Is not the world then necessarily a kind of hypothesis? The scientific method is based upon the idea that we state a null hypothesis, for example, that there is no difference between "Tony" Blair and a unicorn, and then set up an experiment to demonstrate whether or not there is a difference. The world is not necessarily a kind of hypothesis, however. This is simply how we choose to explore it scientifically. Immanuel Kant argued that the world is possible, actual and necessary. The world's existence is clearly necessary to our existence, Sydney. The world is therefore no hypothesis; the world is real! QED
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Post by Deleted on Dec 31, 2013 6:09:07 GMT -5
They are equally unreal are they not? No! "Tony" Blair is a former British Prime Minister whom I once met in Islington, whereas the notion of a unicorn is debatable. Well we differ there, because actually I find that "Tony" Blair has no more reality than your neighbourhood unicorn. The same may be said even of the computer screens at which we are peering. Let us introduce Bishop Berkeley on this point. External objects, he explained, cannot in themselves and apart from our perception of them possess the spatial attributes of distance, size and situation. The visual and tactual aspects of these attributes rob them of all objective validity and reduce them to the status of secondary qualitites existing only in and for consciousness. Moreover, the very term "matter," like all other universals, is found upon analysis to mean and stand for nothing but complexes of experienced qualities. Indeed "existence" itself, except as presence to consciousness, is meaningless! Nothing, then, can be said to exist except minds (spirits) and mental content (ideas). Esse = percipi or percipere. Natural laws are a spiritual phenomenon. And there is no "Tony" Blair apart from the "Tony" Blair in your mind!
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